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Introduction
CSR (corporate social responsibility) disclosure 
evolved as a result of corporate reporting in 
response to changes in conditions in which 
companies operate. Gray, Owen and Adams 
(1996) describe CSR disclosure/reporting as 
“the process of communicating the social and 
environmental effects of the economic actions of 
organizations to particular interest groups within 
society and society at large”. Elkington (1997) 
states that the terms CSR reporting, Social 
Reporting, Corporate Citizenship, Sustainability 
Reporting and Triple Bottom Line Reporting have 
been employed in the studies interchangeably. 
To meet 21st century corporate challenges, 
the corporate reporting system has changed 
somehow with an inclusion of non-financial 
disclosure. Krasodomska and Cho (2017)
explain the extent of non-financial reporting 
presented by the corporation regarding activities 
such as human resources, risk management, 
product innovation and quality, and impact of 
corporate decisions on environment and society. 
The inclusion of this information has become 
a valuable tool for stakeholders to access the 
present value of companies and to project their 
growth. Jamali (2008) and Krasodomska and 
Cho (2017) state that companies are allocating 
more resources and exerting more efforts 
to disclose rich information that companies 
believe to be useful for the stakeholders. One 
reason for such disclosure is to convey useful 
information to stakeholders. Additionally, the 
need to disclose information is also driven 
by the growing awareness of public related to 
CSR issues, thus forcing companies to disclose 
their CSR efforts. Stevie and van Chris (2016) 
conclude that companies’ decisions to report 
CSR are highly motivated by the factors such 
as community concerns and shareholder rights.
In this regard, CSR disclosure is highly 
motivated by the external factor rather than 
internal factors such as board characteristics 
and ownership structure. From a strategic point 
of view, the link between CSR disclosure and firm 
performance is knotty on the basis of manager’s 
strategic decision to allocate resources to CSR 
activities (Wu & Shen, 2013). Unperceiving 
the effect of internal corporate factors can be 
detrimental to the stated relationship between 
CSR and firm performance, as the internal 
players especially the managers have the 
most influencing discretionary role than others 
(Nekhili, Nagati, Chtioui, & Rebolledo, 2017). 
In this regard, the disclosed CSR information 
does not truly depict the relation between CSR 
and firm performance. Equivocal results in the 
literature suggest the need for further research 
to determine the relation between CSR and firm 
performance and to understand the motives 
and methods of the firm to get engaged in CSR 
activities (Margolis & Walsh, 2003). Further, 
this relationship has different results for firms 
engaged in the service industry (Jizi, Salama, 
Dixon, & Stratling, 2014) and for firms in the 
manufacturing industry (Nekhili et al., 2017). 
Firms in the service industry such as banks 
do not harm the environment or community by 
pollution as firms in manufacturing do. However, 
the lending decision and financial provision 
seem to affect the stakeholders.
Surprisingly the above motives are paid 
less attention in developing countries and 
emerging markets. Ali, Frynas and Mahmood 
(2017) hold that in developing countries, 
CSR disclosure is heavily influenced because 
of international buyers, foreign investors, 
international media and international regulatory 
bodies. This potential value of CSR disclosure 
has led companies to disclose CSR information 
and urged researchers to consider research 
on CSR disclosure. However, Krasodomska 
and Cho (2017) study in polish context 
suggests that CSR disclosure has less value 
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not only for financial analysts but also for 
respondent surveyed who also place negligible 
importance to CSR disclosure and the quality 
of CSR disclosure. Additionally, in contrast 
to developed economies, CSR studies in 
emerging economies merely used content 
analysis approach, and mostly the studies 
involve the countries Malaysia, China, South 
Africa and Singapore (Fifka, 2013).
The aim of this study is two-fold. In first 
instance, the study intends to examine the 
impact of CSR disclosure on firm performance 
in the emerging market context such as 
Pakistan. Few studies are available in the 
literature regarding developing countries 
context but the evidences are inconclusive 
(Naeem & Welford, 2009; Syed & Butt, 2017; 
Javaid Lone, Ali, & Khan, 2016). Further, 
it determines the moderating role of executive 
directors in explaining the relationship between 
CSR disclosure and firm performance. It would 
be an interesting finding that how executive 
directors involve in the decisions of CSR 
disclosure, which leads to firm performance. 
The moderating role of executive director in 
the link between CSR disclosure and firm 
performance has rarely examined in the CSR 
literature. Moreover, the moderation role of 
industry dummy is also examined in the paper 
to explain the link between CSR disclosure and 
firm performance. The second objective of this 
paper is to examine the impact of ownership 
structure on firm performance in the presence of 
industry moderation. The ownership structure of 
firm is determined with the help of managerial, 
foreign and state ownership. The data of all 
listed firm at Pakistan Stock exchange from 
2012-2016 is included in the study. The study 
insights will help the firms and strategic decision 
makers to opt for a strategy where to enhance 
firm performance while considering the role of 
CSR disclosure and corporate governance. 
Not only this study will help a firm to accept 
and adopt CSR disclosure more regularly as 
a favourable tool to enhance firm performance 
where it is motivated and adopted voluntarily 
but also will encourage corporate governance 
mechanism under corporate governance laws 
and rules of Pakistan.
The next section of the paper discusses the 
wider role of CSR and its practices. It also explains 
the institutions and legislative role in defining 
CSR for the firms in Pakistan. Section 2 explains 
the theoretical framework specific to CSR and 
firm performance. This section formulates the 
study hypotheses with the help of literature. 
Section 3 demonstrates the research design of 
the study. Section 4 discusses the results of the 
paper and last section of the paper concludes 
the overall findings of the paper.
1. CSR in Pakistan
In developed countries, CSR constitutes as 
a key factor for long corporate survival by gaining 
trust in society, but in Pakistan, CSR is a new 
occurrence, growing steadily with time (Sajjad 
& Eweje, 2014). However, there is a paucity of 
research on CSR in context to Pakistan, which 
has emerged as a latent market to global world 
in past five years. With recent reclassification 
of Pakistan in MSCI index covering 85% of 
the equity universe of Pakistan equity market, 
the country has attained a massive milestone 
in the current decade. KSE 100 index, which 
represents the equity of 100 top companies 
out of all companies listed in Pakistan stock 
exchange, crossed the 50,000 points in 2017. 
According to KPMG report 2015, CSR reporting 
in Asian countries have improved significantly 
since 2013, and now more companies report 
CSR in Asia than companies in other parts of 
the world. Naeem and Welford (2009) assert 
that business in Pakistan is unable to consider 
the corporate social responsibility. However, 
the situation has much changed in 2009, 
after a push from Securities and Exchange 
Commission of Pakistan (SECP) enabled 
CSR reporting as essential for companies. 
Afterward, the approval of CSR disclosure 
guideline in 2012 was a strengthening move for 
the encouragement of CSR disclosure in public 
listed firms of Pakistan. Several other groups 
and organization such as CSR Association of 
Pakistan, National Forum for Environment and 
Health (NFEH), Corporate Social Responsibility 
Center Pakistan, Sustainable Development 
Policy Institute, Triple Bottom Line Pakistan, 
Corporate Social Responsibility Pakistan, 
MNCs and Responsible Business Initiative 
Pakistan have exerted their efforts to promote 
CSR awareness and CSR disclosure culture in 
organizations of the Pakistan. Sajjad and Eweje 
(2014) investigate that multinational companies 
and few big local companies have well-defined 
CSR policies. These companies have favorable 
CSR awareness and disclose CSR, resulting in 
the motivation for other companies to disclose 
CSR and to engage in CSR activities.
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CSR research in Pakistan initiated early 
as unidirectional, where researchers and 
managers focused only on few aspects of CSR 
at a time. Even the firms, which document 
the CSR activities, found to be focused more 
on labor and environment protection areas of 
CSR (Naeem & Welford, 2009). Apparently, the 
keen attention of researchers in Pakistan to 
limited areas of CSR derived from the issues 
of replacement of child labor for adult labor 
in industry pertaining in the early twentieth 
century (Ray, 2000). Henceforth, the focus 
of CSR research was confined mostly to the 
labor, education and health aspects of CSR 
until the involvement of SECP to foster the 
CSR practices. Despite this, the context of 
CSR research in Pakistan is mostly theoretical 
(Sajjad & Eweje, 2014) and no profound 
empirical study has been done to grasp all the 
aspects of CSR.
2. Literature Review and Theoretical 
Framework
2.1 CSR and Firm Performance
CSR disclosure has been widely considered to 
fortify the firms’ performance, albeit this relation 
is merely checked in emerging markets. Besides 
this, literature is populated with baffling results, 
showing no definite and profound relationship 
of CSR with firm performance. Some studies 
show a positive association between CSR and 
firm performance (Agyemang & Ansong, 2017; 
Kabir & Thai, 2017), some shows a negative 
relation (Jennifer Ho & Taylor, 2007), while 
other shows no relationship (Reverte, 2009). 
These equivocal results are because of an 
ambit theoretical and empirical drawback in 
the extent to this relationship. The model of the 
studies was unspecified because of omission 
of essential determinants of firm performance. 
More studies also highlight the extant of this 
relationship is ill drawn because of corporate 
stakeholder mismatching (Wood & Jones, 
1995), disregard for contingency elements 
(Ullmann, 1985), omitted variable bias 
(Aupperle, Carroll, & Hatfield, 1985), neglecting 
mediating factors (Agyemang & Ansong, 2017) 
and measurement errors (Waddock & Graves, 
1997).
From stakeholder theory perspective, CSR 
disclosure allows managers to manage different 
stakeholders by reducing the likelihood of 
negative information such as fiscal, regulatory 
or legislative (Hillman & Keim, 2001), thus 
increasing the stakeholder’s’ confidence in the 
firm. Furthermore, CSR disclosure enables 
firms to attain intangible assets such as good 
will (Hull & Rothenberg, 2008) and an increased 
demand for services and product by working in 
the same manner as advertising works (Sen & 
Bhattacharya, 2001). Firms in emerging market 
believe that slack resources as indispensable 
to support their CSR activities. Cheng, Lin and 
Wong (2016) states that firms in emerging 
markets expect that such an activities will help 
to improve corporate image and to maximize 
shareholders wealth. Unlike in western markets, 
where CSR perceived as a sign of responsible 
attitude of a firm towards the citizens, CSR 
in emerging markets is viewed more as 
a business strategy to maximize the value. 
Stainer (2006) regards CSR as a strategic tool 
to achieve firm’s objective even when a firm 
becomes unable to generate sufficient profits 
and when its sustainability is at risk. Such an 
incentives of CSR disclosure lead us to infer 
our first hypothesis.
H01: CSR disclosure is negatively associated 
with firm performance.
Ha 1: CSR disclosure is positively associated 
with firm performance.
2.2 Moderating Effect of Executive 
Director and Industry Type on CSR 
and Firm Performance
To gauge the extent of corporate governance in 
detail, further consideration of board structure 
is pivotal. The role of board structure diffused 
in the Agency theory in which manager act 
as a steward for the stakeholders of the firm. 
Jizi et al. (2014) state the role of boards with 
a high proportion of independent directors as 
an effective watchdog for the firm. Independent 
directors are believed to derive long-term 
firm value and a high degree of transparency. 
Further, because of less dependency of 
independent directors on the CEO than 
executive directors, they tend to improve 
firm performance and better control the firm. 
Zhu, Ye, Tucker and Chan (2016) confirm the 
argument and find that independent directors 
have strong and influential decision making 
in a group and are positively linked with firm 
value (Reguera-Alvarado & Bravo, 2017). 
However, Liu, Wei and Xie (2014) conclude 
that firms with female executive directors 
have better firm performance than firms with 
female independent directors. This argument 
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supports that executive effect in firm outweighs 
the monitoring effect of independent directors. 
This monitoring role of executive directors also 
helps to encourage and establish a sound CSR 
disclosure environment in the firms. Haniffa 
and Cooke (2005) find Malaysian firms with 
executive directors report more CSR. In this 
context, we believe that executive directors 
have a moderating effect of CSR disclosure and 
firm performance.
H02: Executive board of directors positively 
moderate the relationship between CSR 
disclosure and firm performance.
Ha2: Executive board of directors negatively 
moderate the relationship between CSR 
disclosure and firm performance.
Further, it is also desirable to assert the 
moderating effect of industry type on CSR 
disclosure and firm performance. Different 
levels of CSR disclosure and firm performance 
have been observed in different industries. 
Syed and Butt (2017) find a significant 
relationship between CSR disclosure and 
industry type and suggest the role of industry 
type in CSR disclosure. They conclude that 
companies in different industries have diverse 
motives to disclose CSR activities such as 
more environmental information disclosure by 
the chemical industry. Bayoud (2012) describes 
such motives as to enhance the company 
image and profit. In light of these studies, the 
following hypothesis has been developed to 
check the moderating effect of industry type on 
CSR disclosure and firm performance.
H03: Industry type negatively moderates the 
relationship between CSR disclosure and firm 
performance.
Ha3: Industry type positively moderates the 
relationship between CSR disclosure and firm 
performance.
2.3 Ownership Structure and Firm 
Performance
We further seek whether there is any potential 
association between ownership structure 
and firm performance. Most studies promise 
ownership structure as a key variable of 
the corporate governance as it supplies the 
information about the power of decision makers 
in the corporation. Recent empirical research of 
Kumar and Zattoni (2014) elaborates that listed 
companies in non-Anglo-American countries 
controlled by the larger shareholder, having 
the highest ultimate decision making power 
in the corporation, thus enhancing the firm 
performance by strategic decisions.
Ownership structure has been measured 
on the basis of a set of variables such as 
managerial ownership, foreign ownership, and 
state ownership. These dimensions explain the 
concentration of power in the corporation and its 
impact on the performance. Foreign ownership 
exerts pressure on managers to boost firm 
performance than any other type of ownership 
concentration. It is believed that firm with 
foreign ownership has higher firm performance 
than other firms. Jeon, Lee and Moffett (2011) 
demonstrate in their study of Korean economy 
that foreign investor applies more rigorous 
standards and practices when they evaluate 
the management decisions, thus they have 
more voice in the firm than any other group. 
Khan, Muttakin and Siddiqui (2013) assert 
that due to foreign market exposure, foreign 
investors have different knowledge and values, 
thus force a company to disclose more social 
and environmental information for decision 
making. Studies in Asian markets context yield 
a significant positive result of foreign ownership 
with firm performance (Nakano & Nguyen, 
2013). On the basis of the previous studies, we 
conjecture that our result will match the past 
literature.
H04: Foreign ownership is negatively related 
to firm performance.
Ha4: Foreign ownership is positively related 
to firm performance.
One key aspect of ownership concentration 
that we included in the study is managerial 
ownership. Most of the research of ownership is 
stipulated by using the managerial ownership. 
Based on efficiency perspective, higher 
managerial concentration leads towards 
higher managerial monitoring, thus reduce 
the agency cost (Rashid, 2016). Additionally, 
managerial ownership helps to reduce agency 
cost by increasing motivation and incentives for 
employees and align the interest of employees 
with that of principal. However, very few studies 
construct the relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm performance. Rose (2005) 
rejects the hypothesis on the grounds of 
failing to find any significant relation between 
managerial ownership and firm performance. 
Moreover, controlling for a set of variables, 
Mandacı and Gumus (2010) find a negative 
impact of managerial ownership on firm 
performance. Jensen and Meckling (1976)
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explain that higher managerial ownership may 
lead to agency problem and thus deteriorate the 
firm performance. Managers become cautious 
about their interest in the presence of higher 
managerial ownership hence, firm performance 
declines.
H05: Managerial ownership is positively 
related to firm performance.
Ha5: Managerial ownership is negatively 
related to firm performance.
2.4 Moderating Role of Industry 
Type in State Owned Ownership 
and Firm Performance
Another type of ownership concentration, 
believes to affect the firm performance is 
state ownership. Phung and Mishra (2016) 
find a convex relationship between firm 
performances and state ownership and mention 
that state ownership has different motives 
such as decreasing the unemployment, social 
concern, and political motive. Furthermore, 
such goals have a stark deviation from the 
primary goal of the firm, the shareholder’s 
wealth maximization. A proponent of this 
approach, Gunasekarage, Hess and Hu (2007) 
investigate the effect of ownership structure 
on firm performance and find a negative 
relationship. However, state ownership is 
considered to enhance firm performance by 
helping firms to raise capital easily (Firth, Lin, & 
Wong, 2008). Le and Buck (2011) also indicate 
that connection with state helps the firm to raise 
capital from different sources by getting favor 
from government and thereby enhance firm 
performance. In the case of Pakistan, we found 
that most of the state investment held in service 
based companies and such companies are 
a low performer than other companies included 
in the sample. Based on this, we infer that state 
ownership in service based companies has low 
firm performance.
H06: Industry type positively moderates the 
relationship between state ownership and firm 
performance.
Ha6: Industry type negatively moderates the 
relationship between state ownership and firm 
performance.
3. Research Design
3.1 Sample
The sample data consists of 96 companies 
out of KSE-100 index companies, listed in 
the Pakistan stock exchange from the period 
2012 to 2016. The description of the sample 
selection is presented in Tab 1. Out of 100 top 
listed companies (KSE-100 Index) in PSX, four 
companies are ignored because of unavailability 
of the data over the prescribed period. Further, 
out of 35 sectors that are part of the KSE-100 
index, the data for 34 sectors is collected 
from 2012 to 2016. The sample consists of 64 
companies those are in product industry, and 
the remaining 32 belong to the service industry. 
The sample data has collected for five years by 
using the information published and disclosed 
in the annual reports of the companies. 
Additionally, CSR index is computed by using 
CSR disclosures, corporate governance 
disclosures, directors’ report, Chairman’s 
statement, and notes to the financial statement 
contained in annual reports.
3.2	 Model	Specification
On the basis ofhypothesis above, we use panel 
data regression analysis (fixed or random) to test 
the significance of the models. We developed 
four models to capture the immaculate effect of 
explanatory variables in different models. All the 
models and tests are evaluated in ‘R’ by using 
the plm package, providing a range of flexibility 
and accessibility to do panel data analysis.
Sample size
Number of companies 100
Less: companies wanting incumbent information 4
Total sample size 96
Source: own
Tab. 1: Sample description
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FPERit = αit + CSRDit + FSIZEit + ϵit (1)
FPERit = αit + CSRDit + FSIZEit + 
+ IINDit + EXDit + CEODit + EXDit ×
× CSRDit + ϵit 
(2)
FPERit = αit+ FSIZEit + FROWNit + 
+ STOWNit + MANOWNit +INDSit+ 
+ INDSit × STOWNit + ϵit 
(3)
FPERit = αit + CSRDit + FSIZEit + 
+ IINDit + EXDit + CEODit + 
+ FROWNit + STOWNit + MANOWNit + 
+ INDSit + INDSit * STOWNit + 
+ CSRDit * INDSit+ϵit 
(4)
where FPER, Firm Performance calculated by 
the natural log of firms’ market value of equity 
excluding preferred stock (number of shares * 
market value of shares). Koo and Maeng (2006) 
argue that market-based performance measures 
are a good tool than conventional accounting 
based measures because of less manipulation 
by the managers. CSRD, corporate social 
responsibility disclosure index/score; FSIZE, 
firm size measured by the natural log of total 
assets; IIND, proportion of independent directors 
on board; EXD, proportion of executive directors 
on board; CEOD, factor (dummy) variable with 
levels non-dual and dual; FOROWN, percentage 
of shares hold by the foreign owners; STOWN, 
percentage of shares owned by the state; 
MANOWN, percentage of shares hold by the 
managers; INDS, factor (dummy) variable 
having levels service and product.
Model 1 beholds the effect of CSR disclosure 
on firm performance, while controlling for the 
firm size and tests our first hypothesis (H01) 
of CSR disclosure is negatively associated 
with Firm performance. CSRD index/score is 
calculated by using the data from the annual 
reports of the firm, developing a modified 
list of 20 items (see appendix), on the same 
grounds as developed in the previous studies 
(Jizi et al., 2014; Khan et al., 2013). Each 
category of CSRD index/score is rated from 
a range of 0 to 1 on the basis of the richness of 
information disclosed in the annual report. Jizi 
et al. (2014) affirm the use of annual reports as 
reliable to access the CSR disclosure instead of 
published CSR reports. Accordingly, the CSRD 
is calculated on the basis of maximum attained 
score for a company divided by the maximum 
total score of 20.
Further, we check the reliability of the 
assigned CSRD scores with the use of 
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha from psych 
package. Consistent with the results of previous 
studies such as Jizi et al. (2014) (Kripendroff’s 
alpha of 0.80), and Gul and Leung (2004) 
(Cronbach’s coefficient alpha of 0.51), the 
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha for the out study 
of CSR disclosure index/score is 0.62. This 
statistics provides the consistent reliability of 
alpha in accordance with previous studies. 
Firm size (FSIZE) is used as a control variable, 
and its inclusion in all models is consistent with 
previous studies (Jizi, 2017).
Model 2 tests the moderating role of 
E.D in explaining link between CSR and 
firm performance. This model will be used 
to evaluate H02. Key explanatory variables 
included in the model are IIND, EXD and 
CEOD. IIND represents the proportion of 
independent directors in the board, will check 
the monitoring role of independent directors 
(Nekhili et al., 2017). CEOD is dummy variable 
which holds 1 if the same person is the CEO 
and the chairman of the firm, otherwise 0 (Duru, 
Iyengar, & Zampelli, 2016). The variable EXD* 
CSRD checks the moderating effect of CSRD 
on the relationship between executive directors 
(EXD) and firm performance (FPER).
In model 3, we will regress the ownership 
concentration variable against the dependent 
variable. We will consider the impact of foreign 
ownership (FORWON), state ownership 
(STOWN) and managerial ownership 
(MANOWN) on firm performance. Moreover, we 
will also examine the effect of state ownership 
on firm performance on the basis of industry 
dummy variable. For this purpose, the interacted 
variable STWON*INDS has been added in 
the model. This model will test the hypothesis 
H04, H05 and H06. FOROWN, STOWN and 
MANOWN are calculated as the percentage 
of shares held by the foreign companies and 
individuals, by state and managers (Nekhili et 
al., 2017). Additionally, in Model 4 checks the 
collective effect of all explanatory variables on 
the firm performance and it also examine the 
hypothesis H03. Additionally, the effect of CSR 
disclosure score/index on firm performance on 
the basis of the industry has been evaluated 
by using the interacted variable (Chau & Gray, 
2002).
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4. Results and Discussion
Tab. 2 entails the descriptive statistics for all the 
variables included in the study. The average 
disclosure score is 0.729 with a standard 
deviation of 0.184. The ownership concentration 
is higher for managerial ownership (MANOWN) 
with an average of 18.1%, lowest for state 
ownership (STOWN) with a mean of 7.3% and 
an average of 13.4% for foreign ownership 
(FORWON). The board structure variables 
exhibit that 92.7% of the CEOs in the firms’ 
sample data is not the chairman of the 
board (CEOD), an average of 20.7 of board 
independence (INDD) and an average 23.2 
for executive directors (EXD) of the sample. 
Further, 66.9% of the firms in sample belong 
to product industry (INDS). The dependent 
variable, firm performance (FPER) has an 
average of 23.87 and standard deviation of 
1.616. All the variables are tested for stationary 
using the ADF method and are stationary at the 
unit level.
Further, we supplementary explore the 
mean values of all variables against the CSR 
disclosure (CSRD) for firms with CSRD below 
and above the mean. T test is deployed to test 
the significance of mean differences between 
groups of firms with CSRD > mean and CSRD 
< mean. The test results in Tab. 3 show the 
variation among variables in both groups and 
the results are significant at less than 0.01 and 
0.10 levels. Firms in the service industry are less 
disclosing the CSR and have CSRD < mean. 
Firms with higher board independence are 
more disclosing CSR and are significant at 
a level less than 0.01. Additionally, firms with 
a CSR disclosure index/score higher than the 
mean have state ownership (STOWN) and 
higher firm performance (FPER). However, 
managerial ownership (MANOWN) and firms 
with executive directors (EXD) have disclosure 
index/score less than the mean. Also, a firm 
with the non-dual the role of CEO (CEOD) 
has higher CSR disclosure higher than the 
mean, but not significant at any level. Firm size 
(FSIZE), which is a control variable in our study, 
also differ significantly between both groups 
and is higher for group CSRD > mean. These 
results show the variation among variables 
among the variables and standing of CSRD 
variable in our study. Fig. 1 shows the means 
plot of CSRD over the period of five years and 
reports the increase in CSRD for a sample size 
of 96 firms in each year.
To account for multicollinearity among 
the variables, Tab. 4 presents the correlation 
matrix. Firm performance (FPER) is positively 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev.
CSRD 0.729 0.800 0.184
FSIZE 24.330 24.130 1.784
FOROWN 0.134 0.038 0.227
STOWN 0.073 0.004 0.165
MANOWN 0.181 0.015 0.562
INDD 0.207 0.143 0.145
EXD 0.232 0.222 0.135
CEOD 0.927 2.000 0.260
INDS 0.669 1.000 0.471
FPER 23.870 23.890 1.616
Source: own calculation
Notes: FPER, Firm Performance calculated by natural log of firms’ market value (number of shares * market value of 
shares); CSRD, corporate social responsibility disclosure index/score; FSIZE, firm size measured by the natural log of 
total assets; IIND, proportion of independent directors on board; EXD, proportion of executive directors on board; CEOD, 
factor (dummy) variable with levels non-dual* and dual; FOROWN, percentage of shares hold by the foreign owners; 
STOWN, percentage of shares owned by the state; MANOWN, percentage of shares hold by the managers; INDS, factor 
(dummy) variable having levels service and product*.
Tab. 2: Descriptive statistics of explanatory and independent variables
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related to CSR disclosure index/score (CSRD), 
with a p-value of 0.363. Managerial ownership 
(MANOWN) is negatively related to firm 
performance. However, Firm performance is 
positively related to state ownership (STOWN) 
(p = 0.204) and foreign ownership (FOROWN) 
(p = 0.154). The correlation between board 
structure variables and firm performance is 
positive for independent directors (INDD) 
(p = 0.202) and CEO non-duality (CEOD) 
(p = 0.082), but negative for executive directors 
(EXD) (p = 0.262). Control variable, firm size 
Variables CSRD > mean CSRD < mean p-value
FSIZE 24.650 23.720 0.000***
FOROWN 0.125 0.149 0.261
STOWN 0.085 0.049 0.010***
MANOWN 0.101 0.328 0.001***
INDD 0.223 0.178 0.001***
EXD 0.210 0.273 0.000***
CEOD 0.936 0.911 0.347
INDS 0.302 0.385 0.073**
FPER 24.230 23.210 0.000***
Source: own calculation
Notes: FPER, Firm Performance calculated by natural log of firms’ market value (number of shares * market value of 
shares); CSRD, corporate social responsibility disclosure index/score; FSIZE, firm size measured by the natural log of 
total assets; IIND, proportion of independent directors on board; EXD, proportion of executive directors on board; CEOD, 
factor (dummy) variable with levels non-dual* and dual; FOROWN, percentage of shares hold by the foreign owners; 
STOWN, percentage of shares owned by the state; MANOWN, percentage of shares hold by the managers; INDS, factor 
(dummy) variable having levels service * and product. ***, ** = Statistically significant at less than 0.01 and 0.10 level.
Tab. 3: Differences in the value of the explanatory variables between firms with higher and lower CSRD
Fig. 1: Means plot of CSRD over years
Source: own
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(FSIZE) is positively related to firm performance 
(p = 0.602). Firm performance is negatively 
related to industry variable (INDS) (p = 0.036).
Tab. 5, reports the results of panel 
data regression using firm performance as 
the dependent variable. In model 1, CSR 
disclosure index/score (CSRD) is regressed 
against the firm performance with an inclusion 
of control variable, firm size (FSIZE). The null 
hypothesis of the Hausman test is not rejected 
for model 1 and we used the random model 
to check the impact of explanatory variables 
on the dependent variable. The result shows 
that CSR disclosure index/score is positively 
and significantly related (p < 0.01) with firm 
performance. The model explains 24.1% 
variation in the dependent variable due to the 
inclusion of explanatory variable and control 
variable in the model. The control variable, firm 
size (FSIZE) is also positively related to firm 
performance (FPER) and statistically significant 
at less than 0.01 levels. These results suggest 
the role of CSR disclosure in enhancing the 
firm performance and thus we reject the null 
hypothesis and accept the alternate hypothesis 
(Ha1) that CSR disclosure is positively 
associated with the firm performance. Firms, 
which show responsible business practices 
and are engaged in CSR activities, have higher 
firm performance (Kabir et al., 2017). Firm in 
Pakistan disclose CSR activities to show people 
about their concern about the CSR activities in 
community, environment and within firm, which 
eventually help to enhance profit.
The results of model 2 show the effect of 
board structure along with CSR disclosure 
index/score variable on the firm performance. 
The model explains 19.7% effect of explanatory 
variables on firm performance, where CSRD and 
FSIZE are positively and significantly related 
to firm performance. CEO duality (CEOD) is 
negatively related to firm performance and is 
significant at less than 0.01 levels. It implies that 
CEO duality leads to lower firm performance 
and thus suggests the call for non-dual board 
structure as a default choice instead of dual 
board structure (Tang, 2017). Independent 
directors (IIND) are related positively and 
significantly with firm performance; increase 
in independent directors strengthen the firm 
performance (Khan et al., 2013).
Further this model tests the moderating 
effect of Executive directors (EXD) on the 
relationship between the CSR disclosure and 
CSRD FPER MAWNOWN STOWN FOROWN FSIZE EXD INDD CEOD INDS
CSRD 1
FPER 0.363 1
MAWNOWN -0.236 -0.236 1
STOWN 0.042 0.204 -0.118 1
FOROWN 0.059 0.154 -0.063 -0.110 1
FSIZE 0.215 0.602 -0.188 0.400 -0.033 1
FXD -0.169 -0.262 0.217 -0.163 0.108 -0.323 1
INDD 0.077 0.202 -0.019 0.142 -0.006 0.301 -0.163 1
CEOD 0.032 0.082 0.019 -0.050 -0.025 0.070 -0.219 0.054 1
INDS -0.058 -0.036 -0.059 0.157 -0.066 0.389 -0.337 0.018 0.129 1
Source: own calculations
Notes: FPER, Firm Performance calculated by natural log of firms’ market value (number of shares * market value of 
shares); CSRD, corporate social responsibility disclosure index/score; FSIZE, firm size measured by the natural log of 
total assets; IIND, proportion of independent directors on board; EXD, proportion of executive directors on board; CEOD, 
factor (dummy) variable with levels non-dual* and dual; FOROWN, percentage of shares hold by the foreign owners; 
STOWN, percentage of shares owned by the state; MANOWN, percentage of shares hold by the managers; INDS, factor 
(dummy) variable having levels service and product*.
Tab. 4: Correlation matrix
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firm performance. Executive directors (EXD) 
are found to be insignificant, but the interacted 
variable EXD*CSRD is negatively related to 
firm performance and is significant at (p < 0.05) 
thus we reject the null hypothesis that Executive 
directors positively moderates the relationship 
between CSR disclosure and frim performance. 
These findings suggest that executive directors 
alone have not any noticeable effect on firm 
performance but have a negative a significant 
impact on firm performance when executive 
directors (EXD) are engaged in CSR activities. 
The results support the neoclassical argument 
that firms face additional cost when they engage 
in socially responsible activities and hence 
result in competitive disadvantage (Aupperle 
et al., 1985).
Model 3 highlights the effect of ownership 
structure on firm performance. Foreign 
ownership (FORWON) is positively (β = 1.206) 
related to firm performance and managerial 
ownership (MANOWN) is negatively 
(β = -0.489) related to firm performance and 
are statistically significant (p < 0.01). The 
result supports our alternate hypotheses 
that foreign ownership is positively related to 
firm performance and managerial ownership 
is negatively related to firm performance. 
Despite having low shares, foreign ownership 
helps to monitor corporate activities and thus 
improve firm performance (Mukhopadhyay 
& Chakraborty, 2017). From results, we 
corroborate that foreign ownership in Pakistani 
firm exerts pressure on the management to 
Model 1
Model = Random 
Coefficient
Model 2
Model = Random 
Coefficient
Model 3
Model = Random 
Coefficient
Model 4
Model = Fixed 
Coefficient
CSRD 1.807*** 1.873** 0.492*
FSIZE 0.529*** 0.595*** 0.616** 0.472***
IIND 0.828 1.123**
EXD 1.516 -0.253
CEOD -1.130*** -1.218***
EXD*CSRD -3.359
FOROWN 1.206*** 1.374**
STOWN 0.301 0.522
MANOWN -0.489*** -0.527***
INDS-SER -1.011***
STOWN*INDS -0.244 -2.462*
CSRD*INDS 1.401
Hausman test 
(P Value) 0.508 0.103 0.565 0.0049
R2 0.243 0.251 0.316 0.345
Adjusted R2 0.241 0.197 0.312 0.268
F-stat 76.744 18.069 36.556 19.710
Source: own calculations
Notes: FPER, Firm Performance calculated by natural log of firms’ market value (number of shares * market value of 
shares); CSRD, corporate social responsibility disclosure index/score; FSIZE, firm size measured by the natural log of 
total assets; IIND, proportion of independent directors on board; EXD, proportion of executive directors on board; CEOD, 
factor (dummy) variable with levels non-dual and dual; EXD*CSR, interaction of EXD and CSRD; FOROWN, percentage 
of shares hold by the foreign owners; STOWN, percentage of shares owned by the state; MANOWN, percentage of 
shares hold by the managers; STOWN* INDS ,interaction of STOWN and INDS; INDS, factor (dummy) variable having 
levels service and product*; CSRD* INDS, interaction of CSRD and INDS. ***, **, *,. = Statistically significant at less than 
0.001, 0.01 and 0.05 levels.
Tab. 5: Panel data analysis using firm performance (FPER) as dependent variable
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enhance performance as foreign investors have 
different and shaped knowledge and values. 
Moreover, local investors also gain confidence 
to invest in the company when the foreigners 
in the form of foreign ownership regard a firm. 
These results support the supposition of the 
studies in emerging market context (Khan et 
al., 2013; Nakano & Nguyen, 2013). However, 
Managerial ownership result suggests that firm 
in emerging markets face agency problems that 
dilutes the firm performance.
We did not find any significant direct 
effect of state ownership (STOWN) on firm 
performance. However, we find that state 
ownership in service industry is negatively 
related to firm performance and is significant 
(p < 0.05). This supports our alternate 
hypothesis that industry type negatively 
moderates the relationship between state 
ownership and firm performance. The finding 
suggests that state investment in the service 
industry is not beneficial for the company itself, 
providing support to the argument that state 
goal of investment in the firm and the firm goals 
do not match correspondingly. State ownership 
deteriorates firm performance and results in 
the political intervention (Borisova, Brockman, 
Salas, & Zagorchev, 2012). Additionally, the 
industry dummy variable (INDS) has a negative 
and a significant effect on firm performance, 
showing that firms in product industry have better 
performance than firms in the service industry. 
These results suggest that state ownership in 
firms in Pakistan deters firm performance due 
to corruption, political interference and political 
condition in the country that are the potential 
problems of the country.
In model 4, we regressed all the key 
variables of the study against the dependent 
variable firm performance (FPER). The 
Hausman test avows that fixed effect model 
is the appropriate method to run the model 
(p < 0.0049). Results in this model are in 
accordance with the results of previous models, 
and we did not find any prominent variation in 
the result of each variable concerning model 
1, 2 and 3. Additionally, in this model we will 
test our hypothesis that industry type negatively 
moderates the relationship between CSR 
disclosure and firm performance. The result 
shows that CSR disclosure in firms, those are 
engaged in the service industry is positively 
related to firm performance, thus we reject our 
null hypothesis. R square value explains 26.8% 
variation in the model due to the inclusion of 
all the stated explanatory variables. The finding 
suggests different motives of CSR disclosure 
in different industry types. In Pakistan, most of 
the state investment is in the service industry, 
which is more engaged in CSR disclosure as 
a result of government support to disclose CSR 
voluntarily.
Conclusions
In this study, we empirically examine the effect 
of board characteristics, ownership structure, 
and CSR disclosure on firm performance. The 
CSR disclosure by listed firms in developing 
countries has become a phenomenon during 
recent times. However, the type of CSR 
disclosure is still non-financial. However, it is 
an interesting topic for researchers to evaluate 
the performance of the firm in the presence 
of non-financial disclosure of CSR. This study 
contributes to the existing body of knowledge in 
developing countries context that how CSR non-
financial disclosure, especially in the service 
firms, affect the firm financial performance.
The results of this study reveal that the 
listed firms in the service sector of developing 
country disclose less CSR as compared to 
other sectors. However, CSR disclosure itself 
has a positive and significant impact on the firm 
value. It is an interesting finding and in line with 
CSR literature that CSR has a positive impact 
on firm financial performance. The positive 
link between CSR and CFP is mostly verified 
in developed countries where the awareness 
about CSR is better than developing countries. 
The structural and institutional development 
of CSR is also in its early phases in emerging 
economies Therefore, the results are very 
encouraging for developing countries context 
where the emergence of CSR is a recent 
phenomenon. Moreover the involvement 
of executive directors in CSR disclosure 
has rarely examined in the literature. The 
study contributes to the CSR literature both 
empirically and theoretical that how executive 
director moderates the link between CSR 
disclosure and firm performance. According to 
agency theory, the role of executive director in 
firm’s operation may create conflict of interest 
between managers and shareholders. The 
CSR based activities may become a potential 
source of conflict between agents and principal. 
The manager of a firm takes CSR initiatives 
to get their social and political benefits at the 
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cost of shareholder’s wealth. The same has 
been reflected in the empirical results of this 
study. The link between CSR disclosure and 
financial performance of the firm is positive and 
significant, however, when executive director 
involves in CSR disclosure then it negatively 
moderates the relationship between CSR 
disclosure and firm performance. Further, this 
study also confirms that the state ownership 
is more influential in the service firms as 
compared to other listed firms. Additionally, the 
state ownership has a negative impact on the 
service sector firm performance.
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1) Community Involvement 1. Charitable Donations
2. Sponsorship
3. Health and Education
2) Environmental 1. Environment Policies 
3) Employee Information 1. Number of Employees
2. Employees’ Relations
3. Employees’ Welfare
4. Employees’ Education
5. Employees’ Training & Development
6. Employees’ Profit-Sharing
7. Managerial Remuneration
8. Workers’ Health and Safety
9. Child Labor and Related Actions
4) Product and Service Information 1. Types of Products Disclosed
2. Product Development and Research
3. Product Quality and Safety
4. Discussion of Marketing Network
5. Focus on Customer service & Satisfaction
6. Customer Award/Rating Received
5)  Value-Added Information 1. Value-Added Statement
Source: own
Appendix A: Results of cluster analysis – selected models
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Abstract
hoW corporaTe governance and csr disclosure affecT firm 
performance?
Muhammad Suhaib Manzoor, Ramiz ur Rehman, Muhammad Islam Usman, 
Muhammad Ishfaq Ahmad
The study aims to provide empirical evidence of firm performance relation with board characteristics 
(Independent directors, Executive directors, and CEO duality), ownership structure (Managerial, 
State, and Foreign ownership) and CSR disclosure. The CSR disclosure by listed firms in developing 
countries has become a phenomenon during recent times. However, the type of CSR disclosure 
is still non-financial. However, it is an interesting topic for researchers to evaluate the performance 
of the firm in the presence of non-financial disclosure of CSR. Firm level panel data has collected 
for firms listed in KSE-100 index in Pakistan between 2012 and 2016. The study uses panel data 
analysis to estimate the models using firm size as a control variable. Results of the empirical 
research indicate that firms in the service industry are less disclosing the CSR, but such disclosure 
is positively related to firm performance. The authors find evidence that executive directors when 
engaging into CSR disclosure activities, it negatively and significantly impact the firm performance. 
The authors qualify the results regarding the CEO duality, independent directors, managerial 
ownership, state ownership and foreign ownership with impact on firm performance. Further, the 
results suggest that state ownership is influential in the service industry and negatively affect the 
firm performance. This study contributes to the existing body of knowledge in developing countries 
context that how CSR non-financial disclosure, especially in the service firms, affect the firm 
financial performance. Future research should use cross-country analysis for assessing the models 
and examining the results across countries, industry, and sectors. From a practical perspective, 
the results may guide firms how to engage in CSR disclosure activities without hampering the firm 
performance while considering the other firm level factors. This study is extensively novel in all of its 
contents and contributes mainly to the literature of CSR disclosure and firm performance.
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